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Abstract. Incremental design is an essential part of engineering. With-
out it, engineering would not likely be an economic, nor an eﬀective, aid
to economic progress. Further, engineering relies on this view of incre-
mentality to retain the reliability attributes of the engineering method.
When considering the assurance of safety for such artifacts, it is not sur-
prising that the same economic and reliability arguments are deployed
to justify an incremental approach to safety assurance. In a sense, it is
possible to argue that, with engineering artifacts becoming more and
more complex, it would be economically disastrous to not “do” safety
incrementally. Indeed, many enterprises use such an incremental app-
roach, reusing safety artifacts when assuring incremental design changes.
In this work, we make some observations about the inadequacy of this
trend and suggest that safety practices must be rethought if incremental
safety approaches are ever going to be ﬁt for purpose. We present some
examples to justify our position and comment on what a more adequate
approach to incremental safety assurance may look like.
Keywords: Incremental design improvement · Incremental safety
assurance
1 Introduction
Incremental design improvement, a.k.a. normal engineering design [23], has a 
long history and proven value as a way for constructing improved versions of 
artifacts. This engineering praxis caters for time and budget constraints, ensures 
an artifact’s eﬀectiveness, ﬁtness for purpose, and the reliability of its production. 
We consider that the same considerations guiding incremental design 
improvement have fostered a practice of incremental safety assurance which relies 
heavily on the reuse of existing safety artifacts, e.g., safety related evidence and 
arguments. However, in contrast to incremental design improvement, we argue 
that incremental safety assurance, as presently viewed and practiced, is not nec-
essarily sound. An important reason for this is the global nature of safety as a 
property of a system. Focusing the safety assurance eﬀorts in a localized fashion, 
e.g., on the slice of the system where the design change occurred, may ignore
newly created global hazards or the re-emergence of those that are otherwise
mitigated. Complicating things further, safety artifacts cannot be straightfor-
wardly composed, as the context and the assumptions in one safety artifact may
undermine safety claims established in another. Though these considerations
may seem well-known, that certain current safety practices fail to tackle them
properly indicates that they are neither entirely understood nor easily dealt with.
In this paper, we put forward some observations on why incremental safety
assurance, when understood from the perspective of incremental design improve-
ment, is problematic, and in fact inherently deﬁcient (that is the bad news!). Our
discussion hinges on two main points: compositionality and the defeasibility of
safety arguments, and locality and emergent properties. By elaborating on these
points, we hope to bring to the foreground what we believe is an important issue
of safety practice: the reuse of safety artifacts. While we believe that there is
certainly great practical value in the reuse of safety artifacts, we oﬀer a view
of what a more sound approach to incremental safety assurance might look like
(that is the good news!), this needs of a great deal of caution.
Structure of the paper : In Sect. 2, we explain what incremental safety assurance
means from the perspective of incremental design improvement, commenting on
its underlying philosophy and the necessity for its existence. In Sect. 3, we elabo-
rate on our reservations about such an incremental approach to safety assurance.
In Sect. 4, we substantiate our claims by providing examples from the automo-
tive and medical domains. In Sect. 5, we discuss the challenges and opportunities
presented by an incremental approach to safety assurance. In Sect. 6, we com-
ment on some related work. In Sect. 8, we oﬀer some conclusions and talk about
our next steps.
2 Incremental Safety Assurance
When faced with a problem, engineers tend to build on experience, best prac-
tices, and already existing artifacts, analyzing their pros and cons in order to
try to adapt them (incrementally) to the problem at hand. This approach is
key for guaranteeing an artifact’s reliability and the reliability of its production.
This commonly accepted view of engineering praxis is, among other places, dis-
cussed by Vincenti in [23] under the name of normal design. In Vincenti’s terms,
a design is normal if both the operational principle, i.e., “how the device works”,
and the normal configuration, i.e., “the general shape and arrangement that are
commonly agreed to best embody the operational principle”, are known and used
[23, pp. 208–209]. If either the operational principle or the normal conﬁguration
are largely unknown, or, if known, are left unused, then, the design is radical
[23, p. 8]. Radical design is then to be thought of as based on engineering princi-
ples that are wholly diﬀerent from those guiding normal design. This said, Vin-
centi remarks that “though less conspicuous than radical design, normal design
makes up by far the bulk of day-to-day engineering enterprise” [23, p. 8].
The diﬀerence between normal design and radical design is easily illustrated
in the automotive domain. A case can be made that majority of current vehicles
are based on, reuse, or extend, design elements existing in other vehicles of the
same kind, i.e., normal design. This applies both to the software and hardware
components of a vehicle and enables the automotive industry to rely on well-
tested systems while being up-to-date with technological advances. On the other
hand, the development of an autonomous car would exemplify a radical design.
The inherent practicality of normal design, i.e., of incremental design
improvement, has lead to its enduring prevalence. We consider that it is this
prevalence, as well as the striving for eﬃciency and resource preservation, that
has fostered an incremental approach to safety assurance. It is a given that
designs often become more complex and sophisticated as they evolve from one
version to the next. We are then naturally loathe to discard the immense amount
of safety knowledge collected during the production of a previous version of the
system, and documented in safety artifacts such as safety arguments, hazard
analyses, test data, etc. In analogy with incremental design, it appears both rea-
sonable and practical to take advantage of these safety artifacts and, whenever
possible, e.g., if design changes are deemed “small” or systems are “suﬃciently”
similar, to reuse them so that safety engineers may focus their attention speciﬁ-
cally on the eﬀects of what has changed. This attempt to localize and focus safety
assurance eﬀorts by reusing safety artifacts is what we call an incremental app-
roach to safety assurance, something that we further make clear in Sect. 4, where
we present some real-life examples from the automotive and medical domains.
3 The Pitfalls of Incremental Safety Assurance
In this section we discuss some pitfalls associated with what we call an incre-
mental approach to safety assurance. Our conclusion is that this approach to
safety assurance cannot simply rely on principles analogous to those of incre-
mental design improvement. If it does, it is unsound. This conclusion hinges
on two main points. First, in contrast to what happens in incremental design
improvement, safety assurance artifacts are not compositional. Second, while
incremental design improvement is conducive to localization in terms of design
parts, safety assurance requires a holistic view of the system. We elaborate on
these points in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
3.1 Compositionality of Safety Artifacts
Regarding compositionality, the general idea of a safety argument provides us
with a necessary context for discussion.
It is well-known lore that an argument is a series of assertions, in which
the last element, the conclusion, follows from some foregoing assertions in this
series, the premisses. More precisely, from an inferential standpoint, to ‘follow
from’ means that the conclusion is obtained from the premisses by virtue of
some judiciously chosen rules of inference. The bar against which an argument
is then judged as being well-formed or not, i.e., right or fallacious, rests on an
analysis of the properties that are satisﬁed by these rules of inference. In that
respect, classical logical studies restrict their attention to the rules of inference
of the propositional and the predicate calculus, or some of their variants, such as
those dealing with modalities. Rules of inference of this sort, henceforth called
classical, enjoy the desirable property of being deﬁnite, i.e., they are not subject
to rebuttal. This entails that if a conclusion follows from some premisses and
some other conclusion follows from some other premisses, then, both conclusions
follow from the union of their sets of premisses. In other words, if arguments are
formulated in terms of classical rules of inference, then, they are compositional.
A safety argument is an argument whose main concern is the safety of an engi-
neered artifact. Now, by looking at a safety argument, we can readily conclude
that the rules of inference used in its formulation are far from being adequately
captured as classical rules of inference (after all, we have yet to see deﬁnite safety
claims). On the contrary, our view is that, whenever made explicit, safety argu-
ments are formulated using defeasible rules of inference, i.e., rules of inference
that are open to revision or annulment, e.g., as made precise in Toulmin’s notion
of a rebuttal [22]. This view of safety arguments makes them radically diﬀerent
from classical arguments; it makes them non-compositional. More precisely, as is
well-known in the ﬁeld of defeasible reasoning, in the presence of defeasible rules
of inference, while a conclusion follows from some premisses, and while some
other conclusion follows from some other premisses, neither of these conclusions
may follow from the union of their sets of premisses [11].
In short, the preceding discussion indicates that composing safety arguments
incrementally suﬀers from the inherent problem that this composition step is
clearly unsound. In consequence, if safety arguments are built resorting to defea-
sible rules of inference, then, their compositionality requires principles that are
radically diﬀerent from those underpinning what can be done incrementally.
3.2 Localization of Safety Assurance Eﬀorts
Regarding localization, the general idea of a safety goal decomposition provides
us with the necessary context for discussion.
In essence, safety goal decomposition involves the mapping of safety claims
across diﬀerent levels of the design hierarchy. At the highest levels of design,
some general safety claims are made. At lower, more detailed, levels of design,
these general safety claims are reﬁned into more speciﬁc safety claims, e.g., as
safety claims concerning design parts. Fundamental to the soundness of safety
goal decomposition is the assumption that any reﬁnement step encompasses a
full knowledge of the design elements it involves, how these elements interact,
how these interactions may fail, and what measures can be put in place so that
safety claims are not violated. When looked at from this perspective, safety goal
decomposition requires a holistic view of the design at hand.
This said, the design hierarchy reﬂected in safety goal decomposition has led
some to believe that design parts may be straightforwardly replaced by others
which are substantially equivalent in terms of the safety properties they satisfy.
For us, this is a serious misconception. What the previous chain of reasoning
fails to take into account is that safety claims are not obtained in a localized
fashion, but instead are the result of a reﬁnement mechanism which accounts for
a holistic view of the design hierarchy. If any design part were to be replaced in
any reﬁnement step, not only would it be required to reassess the safety of the
design parts involved in this reﬁnement step, but also to reassess the safety of the
design as a whole. The latter is largely due to the emergent properties, i.e., those
arising from unexpected interactions between the replaced part and the rest of
the system [17]. Because of their implications for safety, and given that they
are not easily identiﬁed in the functional decomposition of a design, emergent
properties are to be dealt with explicitly and seriously; failing to consider them
is a serious omission in incremental safety assurance.
In short, safety assurance eﬀorts cannot easily be limited to the modiﬁed
design parts without considering a holistic view of the system. This means
that, whether design parts and their corresponding safety artifacts may be
replaced, or “plugged-in”, modularly, without completely undermining what has
thus far been deemed safe, requires principles that are radically diﬀerent from
those underpinning incremental design improvement. The approach is otherwise
unsound.
4 Substantiating Our Claims
Focused on what we view are some of paradigmatic examples of safety gone
wrong, in Sect. 4.1 we discuss the case of GM’s faulty ignition switch, and in
Sect. 4.2 we discuss the case of J&J’s DePuy Orthopedics all-metal hip implants.
We argue that these two real-life examples illustrate how what we call an incre-
mental approach to safety assurance presents itself in practice.
4.1 Automotive Domain: The Ignition Switch Case
Not long ago, GM was faced with the recall of 2.6 million cars because of a
defective ignition switch. The problem? The defective ignition switch would
unintendedly move out of the “run” and into the “accessory” position during
driving, leading to a partial loss of electrical power and turning oﬀ the car’s
engine. Why is this a problem? Under certain conditions, this accidental turn
oﬀ of the car’s engine resulted in an unfortunate series of events, which caused
serious harm or death for car occupants; e.g., in a number of cases, this failure
disabled the power steering, the anti-lock brakes, and the airbags, causing some
fatal car crashes.
For us, GM’s defective ignition switch problem is a glaring example of what
may go wrong with an incremental approach to safety assurance. Why? GM
found out that the problem with the ignition switch was the result of a new
switch indent plunger that did not supply enough torque to keep the ignition
from accidentally changing position [20]. It seems that, GM ﬁrst became aware of
the problem in 2001 and started to make incremental changes to the plunger part
to address the issue in 2006 [13]. What went wrong with these changes? At least
two things. First, our view is that when making the design change, GM engineers
focused on meeting the speciﬁcations of an ignition switch, deeming unlikely that
this would introduce any new system level hazards. In a sense, the emphasis was
placed on the physical and structural aspects of the design of the ignition switch.
Second, this seemingly physical modiﬁcation had a bearing on the the overall
safety of the car. Most likely, the software requirements at the conceptual level
of the car assumed that the car is not in motion when the key is in “accessory”
mode. If the car is assumed not to be moving when the key is in “accessory”
mode, it is reasonable to deactivate the airbags in order to prevent unintended
deployment (in a parked car the accidental deployment of airbags could seriously
injure passengers as they enter or exit the car). With the defective ignition
switch, the assumptions underlying these software requirements are undermined.
It was indeed possible for the car to be in motion with the key in “accessory”
mode, e.g., as a result of hitting a bump on the road. (To be noted, the latter
did not occur in cars prior to the problematic ignition switch design, where
more torque was required to change the key position, virtually eliminating the
possibility of the key accidentally changing position).
Can safety be assured locally? Replacing an indent plunger, a seemingly
local issue, has global safety implications, exactly because of the intervention
of a software-based control system. Concentrating solely on the physical or the
software based aspects of the ignition switch may miss the real safety conse-
quences. What the defective ignition switch misses is a global impact analysis of
the design changes. This may have allowed an assessment of which other elements
might have been aﬀected and what new hazards this design change could have
introduced. But this is easier said than done. It was not trivial for GM engineers
to link the infrequent cases of airbags not deploying in an accident after loss of
power steering and power brakes to the defective ignition switch [4,24].
As a ﬁnal remark, touching on the notion of what has been proven in use and
its potential contribution to the safety of a newer car, the determination of what
is safe is intrinsically an evolving notion. Namely, small design changes, such as
changing an indent plunger, may have worked well in the past. Yet, in the past,
losing power to the car may have not been considered to be a catastrophic failure.
E.g., in the past, failure of power steering and brakes would still leave the driver
with some measure of control via manual steering and the mechanical connection
to the brakes. In this past, an engineer dealing with mechanical components may
view the change of the key position as an undesirable event that could result
in a hazardous situation, but the hazard ‘loss of control leads to an accident’
would have been seen as being mitigated by the manual system. Supporting
these claims, at a lawsuit resulting from a fatal accident, an engineer testiﬁed
that the car was “safe” because it “could still be maneuvered to the side of the
road” [13]. People have diﬀerent expectations nowadays.
4.2 Medical Domain: The All-Metal Hip Implant Case
The FDA 510(k) substantially equivalent (SE) criterion for clearance of a new
medical device is another example of what may go wrong with an incremental
approach to safety assurance. Why? By its deﬁnition, the SE criterion relies on
a comparison of a to-be-marketed with an already marketed medical device. In
essence, if changes in design are deemed to be “minor” or “small”, inferences
about the safety of the newer device can be made based on the safety artifacts
of the device already marketed. Framed somewhat diﬀerently, the 510(k) SE
criterion assumes that a small change in design will not likely bring about a
major safety concern. As shown below, this assumption is, at least, problematic.
As reported in [12], in 2005, Johnson & Johnson’s DePuy Orthopedics intro-
duced a new all-metal design for their hip implants. A predecessor version of
these hip implants was made of metal and plastic. The newer hip implants were
cleared for market with the older hip implants being used as a predicate device
using the 510(k) SE criterion. The new all-metal hip implants were cleared for
market based on the fact that their predecessor had been cleared for market. No
clinical trials nor additional tests were performed on the all-metal hip implants.
Thus far, nothing seems to be wrong from an incremental safety assurance per-
spective (more so, a case can be made that the operational principle and the
normal conﬁguration are likely to be suﬃciently similar, if not the same, for
both the all-metal hip implant and its predecessor). The problem? It turned out
that for the case of the all-metal hip implant “[t]he metal was eroding, releasing
metallic particles into the blood and surrounding tissue of the joint and causing
tremendous pain” [12]. This did not occur with the predicate device. It seems
that drawing analogies between designs being substantially equivalent bears no
obvious relationship to their safety. How can such a threat to safety be discovered
if not by re-examining and carrying a thorough re-conceptualization of previously
produced safety artifacts? Moreover, the all-metal hip implant is interesting for
its ancestry, which can be traced back “more than ﬁve decades through a total
of 95 diﬀerent devices, including 15 diﬀerent femoral heads and sleeves and 52
diﬀerent acetabular components” [21]. It seems reasonable to assume that, even
in the presence of impeccable initial safety artifacts, the compounded eﬀects of
design changes led up to a point where a new hazard was indeed present. This
raises the question: do the small tweaks eventually get you?
5 Discussion
In hindsight, the threats to safety mentioned in Sects. 3 and 4 could have been
mitigated with a proper preparation, revision, and perhaps re-conceptualization
of the previously produced safety artifacts. Special attention must be given to
impact that design changes may have on safety (potentially having to conduct
new hazard analyses, reevaluate safety assumptions and the contexts in which
these assumptions were made, etc.). Being able to count on a framework enabling
the tracing of design changes to safety artifacts is a MUST, since it is precisely
this framework that may enable the assessment of the eﬀects of localized design
changes on safety related artifacts. It is at this point where the notion of a
safety case comes into play (a notion popular in some domains, but not so much
in others). We believe that there is a version of incremental safety assurance
that can take the necessary holistic view of safety assurance and perhaps oﬀer a
sort of middle ground between the present practices in many industries and the
uneconomic approach of building all safety artifacts from scratch. Our hypothesis
is that this middle ground would need an explicit safety case in terms of which
to assess the impact that an incremental design change may have on safety. Such
an explicit safety case may then lead to some ability to localize required changes
to safety artifacts, yet not necessarily in the sense of localization to design parts.
The moral of the story? Reuse of safety artifacts can only be sound if we are
able to trace the global eﬀects that design changes may have on the system.
This said, having a well-deﬁned notion of a safety case is only a part of the
big picture. As we have argued above, an incremental approach to safety assur-
ance cannot be based on principles similar to those of incremental design improve-
ment. We are of the view that reusing safety artifacts requires rely/guarantee-like
engineering principles, as understood by the formal methods community [7]. Intu-
itively, these principles may be understood as: the guarantee properties of this
safety artifact are met only if the rely properties of a safety artifact are met. How
hazard analyses, safety related evidence and arguments, test libraries, etc., are to
be dealt with in a rely/guarantee fashion is something largely to be explored.
In summary, while we acknowledge that there is great practical value in the
reuse of safety artifacts, this has to be done with a great deal of caution. We take as
foundational that any incremental approach to safety assurance cannot be based
on those engineering principles underpinning incremental design. Insofar as its
soundness is concerned, what is then needed are engineering principles allowing
for an analysis of the eﬀect that a design change may have on safety artifacts.
Among many things, these principles must involve a careful and thorough review
of the validity of safety arguments. This would enable us to identify whether a
safety argument contains some fallacious inferential steps and to assess the degree
of certainty of the safety claims it involves. As usually conveyed in safety discus-
sions, we view a safety argument as a cornerstone in safety assurance. Without
a safety argument that links safety evidence with safety claims, it is well-nigh
impossible to establish either the relevance and the suﬃciency of the provided evi-
dence, or how this evidence contributes to the safety claims. For us, this needs, as
a ﬁrst step, a precise deﬁnition of a safety argument, i.e., there is a need of a logic
for safety argumentation (this logic need not be a formal logic, but it must be a
logic nonetheless). Moreover, it is our view that emergent properties require spe-
cial attention in safety assurance, as these pose one of the greatest threats to safety
being assured in an incremental fashion. All in all, what is needed is a framework
allowing for safety artifacts to be traced back to the design parts under considera-
tion, enabling an analysis of eﬀect propagation of localized changes, such as those
caused by the addition of a new functionality or the replacement of a design part.
An explicit safety case is a ﬁrst step in the right direction.
6 Related Work
The need for an explicit and properly deﬁned safety case is well-recognized in the
safety community. There is, however, some disagreement regarding what counts
as a “properly” deﬁned safety case. In this respect, we are pluralists: maybe there
is no THE properly deﬁned safety case, but properly deﬁned domain speciﬁc
safety cases. This said, we take as basic that a properly deﬁned safety case shall
consist of explicit safety goals, evidence of their fulﬁllment, acceptance criteria
for the evidence, and a structured argument linking evidence to safety goals.
Among other places, the need for having an explicit safety case is commented
on by Holloway in [15]. Holloway stresses that this is indispensable for evaluat-
ing the reasons why safety assurance practices in the aeronautics domain have
thus far been adequate. Holloway makes this claim in reference to compliance
with DO-178C, a standard which regulates the use of software on commercial
airplanes, in an industry considered to be mature when it comes to safety mat-
ters. Our standpoint here is somewhat similar: without an explicit and adequate
representation of a safety case, its analysis is close to impossible, as is the impact
that design changes may have on safety. Works such as [2,3,8,19] also stress the
importance of having an explicit representation of a safety case. However, in
comparison to ours, these works are focused on what a safety case should look
like, not on the problems with an incremental approach to safety assurance.
Particularly interesting in the context of incremental safety assurance is [18].
The authors of this work comment on how reﬁnement, as understood by the for-
mal methods community, allows for a much needed feature in incremental safety
assurance: the introduction of more detail into the decomposition of safety goals.
As a challenge of adopting such a technique for decomposing safety goals they
point out that reﬁnement leaves little room for revision. This is a consequence
of reﬁnement being conceived in a (logically) monotonic setting. The situation
is radically diﬀerent once one assumes safety properties are defeasible, as we
have discussed in Sect. 3. In such a setting, the traditional ideas of reﬁnement do
not apply straightforwardly (e.g., it may be the case that reﬁning a safety goal
into two safety subgoals results in one of the subgoals undermining the other).
Considering this phenomenon is crucial if safety assurance is to be thought of
incrementally.
Works such as [1,6,9,14] are also related to incremental safety assurance. All
of these works have in common with ours a discussion of safety being assured
in an incremental fashion. However, in comparison with ours, their approach is
presented from the point of view of techniques rather than principles. In that
respect, they do not seem to discuss the issues that we have commented on in
Sects. 3 and 4. Though they address and suggest a component based approach to
safety assurance, they do not discuss how such components may be put together
in a property preserving manner.
7 Some Final Remarks
Given that incremental design improvement is prevalent as an engineering prac-
tice, it is no surprise that matters related to the associated idea of incremental
safety assurance appear in various safety standards and guidelines via the reuse
of design elements.
The automotive domain incorporated the notion of proven in use in the
recently published ISO 26262 standard for the functional safety of vehicles.
In ISO 26262 deﬁnes proven in use as “an alternate means of compliance [...]
that may be used in the case of reuse of existing items or elements when ﬁeld
data is available” [16, Part 8, Clause 14]. ISO 26262 also introduces the concept
of safety element out of context (SEOoC). A SEOoC is “intended to be used in
multiple diﬀerent items when the validity of its assumptions can be established
during integration of the SEOoC” [16, Part 10, Clause 9]. Both ‘proven in use’
and SEOoC fall within an incremental approach to safety assurance under the
assumption that they involve the reuse of the safety artifacts attached to a design
element, with the purpose of contributing to the safety of a newly developed car.
The medical domain has its well-known 510(k) process. The US FDA deﬁnes
the so called ‘510(k) program’ as “a premarketing submission made to FDA to
demonstrate that the [medical] device to be marketed is as safe and eﬀective, that
is, substantially equivalent (SE), to a legally marketed device that is not subject
to premarket approval (PMA)” [5]. The SE condition indicates that the changes
incorporated into the new medical device are somewhat “small” in relation to
the already marketed medical device, from which the new device’s safety follows.
If looked at from this perspective, the FDA’s 510(k) program is another instance
of an incremental approach to safety assurance: small design changes cause no
eﬀect on the artifact’s safety.
In avionics, an incremental approach to safety assurance may be seen as being
present in the FAA’s AC 20-148: Reusable Software Components [10]. In this
advisory circular, the FAA comments that “because of economic incentives and
advances in software component technology, software developers want to develop
a reusable software component (RSC) that can be integrated into many systems’
target computers and environments with other system software applications”,
all while still showing compliance with avionics safety regulations. As with ISO
26262’s notion of a SEOoC, if we agree that a RSC involves the reuse of safety
artifacts, then, it is more or less clear that this falls within the scope of what we
call an incremental approach to safety assurance.
Following from the observations just made, to be noted is that, while the
deﬁnitions and practices may vary across domains, a great deal of care should
be taken so that these safety standards and guidelines are not undermined by
the pitfalls and deﬁciencies that we discussed in Sects. 3 and 4.
8 Conclusions and Next Steps
Incremental design improvement, a.k.a. normal design, is a reliable and standard
foundation for engineering practice. It is well understood, generally economic,
and it supports the need and desire to see improvements in the artifacts that
we use. When these are safety critical, the question becomes: how are safety
related issues, arising due to changes in design, to be incorporated into the safety
assurance scheme? We have argued that the obvious analogy to incremental
design improvement encounters serious diﬃculties related to identifying new or
re-emerging safety issues.
We have also discussed some of the principles and examples of an incremen-
tal approach to safety assurance. Resorting to the latter, we have shown that
safety related issues were missed, leading to some catastrophic results. In our
view, shared by some, the fundamental problem, the root cause of the mistakes,
is that, even though design changes might be local, as in the ignition switch
example, their eﬀects on safety assurance are of a global nature. More generally,
mistaking incremental design change for limited eﬀects on safety has resulted
in essential diﬃculties related to safety, and serious damage to people, com-
pletely undermining claims about safety. This has been worsened by the fact
that the safety cases often remain implicit, making it very diﬃcult to determine
the global safety eﬀects of the localized design change. Of course, we do recognize
that when safety engineers have a great deal of experience, and they devote suf-
ﬁcient attention to the eﬀects of design modiﬁcations on safety artifacts, things
appear to run smoothly, even if approached incrementally. The problem is that
this is diﬃcult to evaluate externally, i.e., without the inside knowledge these
safety engineers may have. If looked at from this perspective, rather than an
engineering discipline, safety assurance becomes something that falls within the
realm of obscurantism and practiced by safety gurus.
Conversely, our position is that, incremental safety assurance needs principles
other than those underpinning incremental design improvement. These princi-
ples will deﬁne the basis for analyzing how incremental design changes impact
existing safety artifacts. Thus, our recommendation goes beyond that of produc-
ing an explicit safety case. This said, safety cases are deﬁnitely necessary. It is
with respect to them that the eﬀects that design changes may have on safety
may be tracked down more easily, establishing a foundation for eliciting sound
engineering principles for incremental safety assurance. In any case, our proposal
is not the one usually put forward in the context of safety assurance: start afresh
from the ground up. We recognize that while perhaps viable in domains where
changes in design seldom occur, this is economically and logistically infeasible
when changes in design are frequent, as is the case in the automotive and med-
ical domains. As future work, we need to rigorously develop and systematize our
hypotheses, so that they can be evaluated in carefully conducted experiments.
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